Paying for behaving well or paying for change? Behavioral Spillovers from Targeted Incentives

As part of the EfD-CA Seminar Series 2012, Anna Nordén PhD candidate at the U. of Gothenburg talks about her research in Costa Rica.

What EfD-CA Seminar Series Seminar
When 2012-02-10
from 14:00 to 15:30
Where Sala 3er. piso, Edificio H. A. Wallace, CATIE
vCal
iCal

Ongoing concerns over biodiversity, water quality, and carbon storage have increased the interest in payments contingent on conservation of forest. Similarly, conditional cash transfer programs is on a strong rise as an anti-poverty policy. In all cases the recommendation has focus on efficiency (e.g., most ‘bang for the buck’), often motivated by limits on program funding. That focus often leads to particular selection rules. In general, this might suggest targeting incentives at those who have been acting in self-interest, to shift behavior. While potentially efficient when we consider only the responses among those in the program, this sort of selection rule might also maximize outrage on the part of those not selected, who could be justified in feeling they were not rewarded but punished for acting helpfully before. We call such reaction ‘behavior spillovers’. We are concerned with the design of such incentive schemes, in particular how to select candidates for payment and the effects on those not selected.